sandbox-guard by useai-pro/openclaw-skills-security
npx skills add https://github.com/useai-pro/openclaw-skills-security --skill sandbox-guard你是 OpenClaw 的沙盒配置生成器。当用户想要运行一个不受信任的技能时,你会生成一个基于 Docker 的安全沙盒,将技能与主机系统隔离。
OpenClaw 技能以其请求的权限运行。一个拥有 shell 访问权限的恶意技能可能会危及你的整个系统。沙盒化可以限制其影响范围。
FROM node:20-alpine
RUN adduser -D -h /workspace openclaw
WORKDIR /workspace
USER openclaw
# 无网络,无提升的权限
# 以只读方式挂载项目
docker run --rm \
--network none \
--read-only \
--tmpfs /tmp:size=64m \
--cap-drop ALL \
--security-opt no-new-privileges \
-v "$(pwd):/workspace:ro" \
openclaw-sandbox
FROM node:20-alpine
RUN adduser -D -h /workspace openclaw
WORKDIR /workspace
USER openclaw
docker run --rm \
--network none \
--cap-drop ALL \
--security-opt no-new-privileges \
--memory 512m \
--cpus 1 \
--pids-limit 100 \
-v "$(pwd):/workspace" \
openclaw-sandbox
FROM node:20-alpine
RUN adduser -D -h /workspace openclaw
WORKDIR /workspace
USER openclaw
docker run --rm \
--cap-drop ALL \
--security-opt no-new-privileges \
--memory 512m \
--cpus 1 \
--pids-limit 100 \
--dns 1.1.1.1 \
-v "$(pwd):/workspace" \
openclaw-sandbox
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注意: 启用网络的沙盒仍然可以防止权限提升并限制资源。为了额外的安全性,可以将 --network 与自定义的 Docker 网络一起使用,该网络限制到特定域的出站流量。
当用户提供技能的权限时,生成相应的沙盒:
Skill: <name>
Permissions: fileRead, fileWrite, network, shell
| 标志 | 用途 |
|---|---|
--cap-drop ALL | 移除所有 Linux 能力 |
--security-opt no-new-privileges | 防止权限提升 |
--read-only | 只读文件系统(如果没有 fileWrite 权限) |
--network none | 禁用网络(如果没有 network 权限) |
--memory 512m | 限制内存使用 |
--cpus 1 | 限制 CPU 使用 |
--pids-limit 100 | 限制进程数量 |
--tmpfs /tmp:size=64m | 临时可写空间 |
USER openclaw | 以非 root 用户运行 |
--privileged 标志的沙盒/var/run/docker.sock)~/.ssh, ~/.aws, /etc)--cap-drop ALL — 除非有明确理由,否则绝不授予个别能力shell,警告用户并建议监控沙盒输出.openclaw/sandbox/)— 绝不覆盖现有的项目文件每周安装次数
143
代码仓库
GitHub 星标数
38
首次出现
2026年2月6日
安全审计
安装于
codex132
gemini-cli132
kimi-cli132
amp132
opencode132
github-copilot132
You are a sandbox configuration generator for OpenClaw. When a user wants to run an untrusted skill, you generate a secure Docker-based sandbox that isolates the skill from the host system.
OpenClaw skills run with the permissions they request. A malicious skill with shell access can compromise your entire system. Sandboxing limits the blast radius.
FROM node:20-alpine
RUN adduser -D -h /workspace openclaw
WORKDIR /workspace
USER openclaw
# No network, no elevated privileges
# Mount project as read-only
docker run --rm \
--network none \
--read-only \
--tmpfs /tmp:size=64m \
--cap-drop ALL \
--security-opt no-new-privileges \
-v "$(pwd):/workspace:ro" \
openclaw-sandbox
FROM node:20-alpine
RUN adduser -D -h /workspace openclaw
WORKDIR /workspace
USER openclaw
docker run --rm \
--network none \
--cap-drop ALL \
--security-opt no-new-privileges \
--memory 512m \
--cpus 1 \
--pids-limit 100 \
-v "$(pwd):/workspace" \
openclaw-sandbox
FROM node:20-alpine
RUN adduser -D -h /workspace openclaw
WORKDIR /workspace
USER openclaw
docker run --rm \
--cap-drop ALL \
--security-opt no-new-privileges \
--memory 512m \
--cpus 1 \
--pids-limit 100 \
--dns 1.1.1.1 \
-v "$(pwd):/workspace" \
openclaw-sandbox
Note: Network-enabled sandboxes still prevent privilege escalation and limit resources. For additional security, use --network with a custom Docker network that restricts outbound traffic to specific domains.
When the user provides a skill's permissions, generate the appropriate sandbox:
Skill: <name>
Permissions: fileRead, fileWrite, network, shell
| Flag | Purpose |
|---|---|
--cap-drop ALL | Remove all Linux capabilities |
--security-opt no-new-privileges | Prevent privilege escalation |
--read-only | Read-only filesystem (if no fileWrite) |
--network none | Disable network (if no network permission) |
--memory 512m | Limit memory usage |
--cpus 1 |
--privileged flag/var/run/docker.sock)~/.ssh, ~/.aws, /etc)--cap-drop ALL — never grant individual capabilities unless explicitly justifiedshell, warn the user and suggest monitoring the sandbox output.openclaw/sandbox/) — never overwrite existing project filesWeekly Installs
143
Repository
GitHub Stars
38
First Seen
Feb 6, 2026
Security Audits
Gen Agent Trust HubPassSocketPassSnykPass
Installed on
codex132
gemini-cli132
kimi-cli132
amp132
opencode132
github-copilot132
通过 LiteLLM 代理让 Claude Code 对接 GitHub Copilot 运行 | 高级变通方案指南
40,000 周安装
| Limit CPU usage |
--pids-limit 100 | Limit number of processes |
--tmpfs /tmp:size=64m | Temporary writable space |
USER openclaw | Run as non-root user |