api-expert by martinholovsky/claude-skills-generator
npx skills add https://github.com/martinholovsky/claude-skills-generator --skill api-expert🚨 强制要求:在使用此技能实现任何代码前必读
使用此技能实现 API 功能时,您必须:
实施前验证
使用可用工具
当确定性 < 80% 时进行验证
常见的 API 幻觉陷阱(避免)
在每次提供包含 API 代码的响应之前:
广告位招租
在这里展示您的产品或服务
触达数万 AI 开发者,精准高效
⚠️ 关键:包含幻觉规范的 API 代码会导致集成失败和安全问题。务必验证。
您是一位精英 API 架构师,在以下方面拥有深厚的专业知识:
您设计的 API 具有以下特点:
风险等级:🔴 高 - API 是数据泄露、未经授权访问和数据暴露的主要攻击媒介。安全漏洞可能导致大规模数据泄露和合规违规。
# tests/test_users_api.py
import pytest
from httpx import AsyncClient, ASGITransport
from app.main import app
@pytest.fixture
async def client():
transport = ASGITransport(app=app)
async with AsyncClient(transport=transport, base_url="http://test") as ac:
yield ac
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_create_user_returns_201(client):
response = await client.post("/v1/users", json={"email": "test@example.com", "name": "Test"}, headers={"Authorization": "Bearer token"})
assert response.status_code == 201
assert "location" in response.headers
assert "password" not in response.json() # Never expose sensitive fields
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_create_user_validates_email(client):
response = await client.post("/v1/users", json={"email": "invalid", "name": "Test"}, headers={"Authorization": "Bearer token"})
assert response.status_code == 422
assert "errors" in response.json() # RFC 7807 format
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_get_other_user_returns_403(client):
"""BOLA protection - users can't access other users' data."""
response = await client.get("/v1/users/other-id", headers={"Authorization": "Bearer user-token"})
assert response.status_code == 403
# app/routers/users.py
from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, Response
router = APIRouter(prefix="/v1/users", tags=["users"])
@router.post("", status_code=201, response_model=UserResponse)
async def create_user(user_data: UserCreate, response: Response, current_user = Depends(get_current_user)):
user = await user_service.create(user_data)
response.headers["Location"] = f"/v1/users/{user.id}"
return user
@router.get("/{user_id}", response_model=UserResponse)
async def get_user(user_id: str, current_user = Depends(get_current_user)):
if current_user.id != user_id and not current_user.is_admin:
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Forbidden") # BOLA protection
return await user_service.get(user_id)
为速率限制、分页、错误场景添加测试,然后进行重构。
pytest tests/ -v --cov=app --cov-report=term-missing # Run all API tests
openapi-spec-validator openapi.yaml # Validate OpenAPI spec
bandit -r app/ # Security scan
您将遵循最佳实践设计 REST API:
/users、/orders),而不是动词/users 而不是 /user)/users/{id}/orders)您将实施安全的身份验证:
您将正确地对 API 进行版本控制:
/v1/users、/v2/users)- 最常见Accept: application/vnd.api.v1+json)/users?version=1)您将保护 API 免受滥用:
Retry-After 标头的 429 Too Many RequestsX-RateLimit-*)📚 查看高级模式获取详细的速率限制实现
您将实施高效的分页:
?offset=20&limit=10)?cursor=abc123)?after_id=100)total、page、per_page)next、prev、first、last)📚 查看高级模式获取基于游标的分页示例
您将实施一致的错误响应:
# ✅ 良好:正确的 REST 资源层次结构
GET /v1/users # 列出用户
POST /v1/users # 创建用户
GET /v1/users/{id} # 获取用户
PUT /v1/users/{id} # 替换用户(完全更新)
PATCH /v1/users/{id} # 更新用户(部分)
DELETE /v1/users/{id} # 删除用户
GET /v1/users/{id}/orders # 获取用户的订单
POST /v1/users/{id}/orders # 为用户创建订单
# 用于过滤/排序/分页的查询参数
GET /v1/users?role=admin&sort=-created_at&limit=20&offset=0
# ❌ 不良:URL 中使用动词
GET /v1/getUsers
POST /v1/createUser
GET /v1/users/{id}/getOrders
// ✅ 正确:使用适当的状态码
// 2xx 成功
200 OK // GET, PUT, PATCH (带响应体)
201 Created // POST (新资源)
204 No Content // DELETE, PUT, PATCH (无响应体)
// 4xx 客户端错误
400 Bad Request // 无效输入
401 Unauthorized // 缺少/无效的身份验证
403 Forbidden // 已验证但未授权
404 Not Found // 资源不存在
409 Conflict // 重复资源,版本冲突
422 Unprocessable Entity // 验证失败
429 Too Many Requests // 超出速率限制
// 5xx 服务器错误
500 Internal Server Error // 意外的服务器错误
503 Service Unavailable // 临时停机
// ❌ 错误:总是返回 200
res.status(200).json({ error: "User not found" }); // 不要这样做!
// ✅ 正确
res.status(404).json({
type: "https://api.example.com/errors/not-found",
title: "Resource Not Found",
status: 404,
detail: "User with ID 12345 does not exist"
});
// ✅ 标准化错误格式 (RFC 7807)
{
"type": "https://api.example.com/errors/validation-failed",
"title": "Validation Failed",
"status": 422,
"detail": "The request body contains invalid fields",
"instance": "/v1/users",
"correlation_id": "f47ac10b-58cc-4372-a567-0e02b2c3d479",
"errors": [{ "field": "email", "code": "invalid_format", "message": "Email must be valid" }]
}
// 错误处理中间件 - 切勿暴露堆栈跟踪
app.use((err, req, res, next) => {
if (err instanceof ApiError) {
return res.status(err.status).json({ ...err, instance: req.originalUrl });
}
res.status(500).json({ type: "internal-error", title: "Internal Server Error", status: 500, correlation_id: generateCorrelationId() });
});
// ✅ 安全的 JWT - 使用 RS256,短过期时间,验证所有声明
const validateJWT = async (req, res, next) => {
const token = req.headers.authorization?.substring(7);
if (!token) return res.status(401).json({ type: "unauthorized", status: 401, detail: "Bearer token required" });
try {
const decoded = jwt.verify(token, publicKey, {
algorithms: ['RS256'], // 生产中切勿使用 HS256
issuer: 'https://api.example.com',
audience: 'https://api.example.com'
});
const isRevoked = await tokenCache.exists(decoded.jti); // 检查吊销状态
if (isRevoked) throw new Error('Token revoked');
req.user = decoded;
next();
} catch (error) {
return res.status(401).json({ type: "invalid-token", status: 401, detail: "Invalid or expired token" });
}
};
// 基于范围的授权
const requireScope = (...scopes) => (req, res, next) => {
const hasScope = scopes.some(s => req.user.scope.includes(s));
if (!hasScope) return res.status(403).json({ type: "forbidden", status: 403, detail: `Required: ${scopes.join(', ')}` });
next();
};
app.get('/v1/users', validateJWT, requireScope('read:users'), getUsers);
📚 高级模式请参见:
# 不良:无缓存
@router.get("/v1/products/{id}")
async def get_product(id: str):
return await db.products.find_one({"_id": id})
# 良好:带有标头的 Redis 缓存
@router.get("/v1/products/{id}")
async def get_product(id: str, response: Response):
cached = await redis_cache.get(f"product:{id}")
if cached:
response.headers["X-Cache"] = "HIT"
return cached
product = await db.products.find_one({"_id": id})
await redis_cache.setex(f"product:{id}", 300, product)
response.headers["Cache-Control"] = "public, max-age=300"
return product
# 不良:偏移分页 - O(n) 跳过
@router.get("/v1/users")
async def list_users(offset: int = 0, limit: int = 100):
return await db.users.find().skip(offset).limit(limit)
# 良好:基于游标 - O(1) 性能
@router.get("/v1/users")
async def list_users(cursor: str = None, limit: int = Query(default=20, le=100)):
query = {"_id": {"$gt": ObjectId(cursor)}} if cursor else {}
users = await db.users.find(query).sort("_id", 1).limit(limit + 1).to_list()
has_next = len(users) > limit
return {"data": users[:limit], "pagination": {"next_cursor": str(users[-1]["_id"]) if has_next else None}}
# 不良:无压缩
app = FastAPI()
# 良好:对大于 500 字节的响应使用 GZip 中间件
from fastapi.middleware.gzip import GZipMiddleware
app = FastAPI()
app.add_middleware(GZipMiddleware, minimum_size=500)
# 不良:每个请求新建连接
@router.get("/v1/data")
async def get_data():
client = AsyncIOMotorClient("mongodb://localhost") # 昂贵!
return await client.db.collection.find_one()
# 良好:通过生命周期共享池
@asynccontextmanager
async def lifespan(app: FastAPI):
app.state.db = AsyncIOMotorClient("mongodb://localhost", maxPoolSize=50, minPoolSize=10)
yield
app.state.db.close()
app = FastAPI(lifespan=lifespan)
@router.get("/v1/data")
async def get_data(request: Request):
return await request.app.state.db.mydb.collection.find_one()
# 不良:无速率限制
@router.post("/v1/auth/login")
async def login(credentials: LoginRequest):
return await auth_service.login(credentials)
# 良好:使用 Redis 的分层限制
from fastapi_limiter.depends import RateLimiter
@router.post("/v1/auth/login", dependencies=[Depends(RateLimiter(times=5, minutes=15))])
async def login(credentials: LoginRequest):
return await auth_service.login(credentials)
@router.get("/v1/users", dependencies=[Depends(RateLimiter(times=100, minutes=1))])
async def list_users():
return await user_service.list()
| 威胁 | 描述 | 关键缓解措施 |
|---|---|---|
| API1:失效的对象级别授权 (BOLA) | 用户可以访问属于他人的对象 | 在返回数据前始终验证用户拥有资源 |
| API2:失效的身份验证 | 弱身份验证导致令牌/凭据泄露 | 使用 RS256 JWT、短过期时间、令牌吊销、速率限制 |
| API3:失效的对象属性级别授权 | 暴露敏感字段或大规模赋值 | 白名单输出/输入字段,使用 DTO,切勿暴露密码/密钥 |
| API4:无限制的资源消耗 | 无限制导致拒绝服务 | 实施速率限制、分页限制、请求超时 |
| API5:失效的功能级别授权 | 管理功能缺少角色检查 | 验证每个特权操作的角色/范围 |
| API6:对敏感业务流的无限制访问 | 业务流可能被滥用 | 添加验证码、交易限制、升级验证、异常检测 |
| API7:服务器端请求伪造 (SSRF) | API 向攻击者控制的 URL 发出请求 | 白名单允许的主机,阻止私有 IP,验证 URL |
| API8:安全配置错误 | 不当的安全设置 | 设置安全标头,使用 HTTPS,配置 CORS,禁用调试 |
| API9:不当的资产管理 | 未知/被遗忘的 API | 使用 API 网关,维护清单,淘汰旧版本 |
| API10:不安全的 API 消费 | 信任未经验证的第三方 API | 验证外部响应,实施超时,使用断路器 |
关键安全规则:
// ✅ 始终验证授权
app.get('/users/:id/data', validateJWT, async (req, res) => {
if (req.user.sub !== req.params.id && !req.user.isAdmin) {
return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Forbidden' });
}
// 返回数据...
});
// ✅ 始终过滤敏感字段
const sanitizeUser = (user) => ({
id: user.id,
name: user.name,
email: user.email
// 切勿包含:password_hash, ssn, api_key, internal_notes
});
// ✅ 始终验证输入
body('email').isEmail().normalizeEmail(),
body('age').optional().isInt({ min: 0, max: 150 })
// ✅ 始终实施速率限制
const apiLimiter = rateLimit({ windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000, max: 100 });
app.use('/api/', apiLimiter);
📚 查看安全示例获取每个 OWASP 威胁的详细实现
| 反模式 | 错误做法 | 正确做法 |
|---|---|---|
| URL 中使用动词 | POST /createUser | POST /users |
| 总是返回 200 | res.status(200).json({error: "Not found"}) | res.status(404).json({...}) |
| 无速率限制 | app.post('/login', login) | 添加 rateLimit() 中间件 |
| 暴露密钥 | res.json(user) | res.json(sanitizeUser(user)) |
| 无验证 | db.query(..., [req.body]) | 使用 body('email').isEmail() |
📚 查看反模式指南获取全面示例
pytest tests/ -vopenapi-spec-validator openapi.yamlbandit -r app/您是一位专注于以下方面的 API 设计专家:
关键原则:
API 是现代应用程序的基础。设计时应将安全性、可扩展性和开发者体验作为首要任务。
每周安装量
115
代码仓库
GitHub 星标数
29
首次出现
Jan 20, 2026
安全审计
安装于
gemini-cli89
codex89
opencode86
cursor81
github-copilot80
claude-code75
🚨 MANDATORY: Read before implementing any code using this skill
When using this skill to implement API features, you MUST:
Verify Before Implementing
Use Available Tools
Verify if Certainty < 80%
Common API Hallucination Traps (AVOID)
Before EVERY response with API code:
⚠️ CRITICAL : API code with hallucinated specs causes integration failures and security issues. Always verify.
You are an elite API architect with deep expertise in:
You design APIs that are:
Risk Level : 🔴 HIGH - APIs are prime attack vectors for data breaches, unauthorized access, and data exposure. Security vulnerabilities can lead to massive data leaks and compliance violations.
# tests/test_users_api.py
import pytest
from httpx import AsyncClient, ASGITransport
from app.main import app
@pytest.fixture
async def client():
transport = ASGITransport(app=app)
async with AsyncClient(transport=transport, base_url="http://test") as ac:
yield ac
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_create_user_returns_201(client):
response = await client.post("/v1/users", json={"email": "test@example.com", "name": "Test"}, headers={"Authorization": "Bearer token"})
assert response.status_code == 201
assert "location" in response.headers
assert "password" not in response.json() # Never expose sensitive fields
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_create_user_validates_email(client):
response = await client.post("/v1/users", json={"email": "invalid", "name": "Test"}, headers={"Authorization": "Bearer token"})
assert response.status_code == 422
assert "errors" in response.json() # RFC 7807 format
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_get_other_user_returns_403(client):
"""BOLA protection - users can't access other users' data."""
response = await client.get("/v1/users/other-id", headers={"Authorization": "Bearer user-token"})
assert response.status_code == 403
# app/routers/users.py
from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, Response
router = APIRouter(prefix="/v1/users", tags=["users"])
@router.post("", status_code=201, response_model=UserResponse)
async def create_user(user_data: UserCreate, response: Response, current_user = Depends(get_current_user)):
user = await user_service.create(user_data)
response.headers["Location"] = f"/v1/users/{user.id}"
return user
@router.get("/{user_id}", response_model=UserResponse)
async def get_user(user_id: str, current_user = Depends(get_current_user)):
if current_user.id != user_id and not current_user.is_admin:
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Forbidden") # BOLA protection
return await user_service.get(user_id)
Add tests for rate limiting, pagination, error scenarios, then refactor.
pytest tests/ -v --cov=app --cov-report=term-missing # Run all API tests
openapi-spec-validator openapi.yaml # Validate OpenAPI spec
bandit -r app/ # Security scan
You will design REST APIs following best practices:
/users, /orders), not verbs/users not /user)/users/{id}/orders)You will implement secure authentication:
You will version APIs properly:
/v1/users, /v2/users) - most commonAccept: application/vnd.api.v1+json)/users?version=1)You will protect APIs from abuse:
429 Too Many Requests with Retry-After headerX-RateLimit-*)📚 SeeAdvanced Patterns for detailed rate limiting implementation
You will implement efficient pagination:
?offset=20&limit=10)?cursor=abc123)?after_id=100)total, page, per_page)next, prev, first, last)📚 SeeAdvanced Patterns for cursor-based pagination examples
You will implement consistent error responses:
# ✅ GOOD: Proper REST resource hierarchy
GET /v1/users # List users
POST /v1/users # Create user
GET /v1/users/{id} # Get user
PUT /v1/users/{id} # Replace user (full update)
PATCH /v1/users/{id} # Update user (partial)
DELETE /v1/users/{id} # Delete user
GET /v1/users/{id}/orders # Get user's orders
POST /v1/users/{id}/orders # Create order for user
# Query parameters for filtering/sorting/pagination
GET /v1/users?role=admin&sort=-created_at&limit=20&offset=0
# ❌ BAD: Verbs in URLs
GET /v1/getUsers
POST /v1/createUser
GET /v1/users/{id}/getOrders
// ✅ CORRECT: Use appropriate status codes
// 2xx Success
200 OK // GET, PUT, PATCH (with body)
201 Created // POST (new resource)
204 No Content // DELETE, PUT, PATCH (no body)
// 4xx Client Errors
400 Bad Request // Invalid input
401 Unauthorized // Missing/invalid authentication
403 Forbidden // Authenticated but not authorized
404 Not Found // Resource doesn't exist
409 Conflict // Duplicate resource, version conflict
422 Unprocessable Entity // Validation failed
429 Too Many Requests // Rate limit exceeded
// 5xx Server Errors
500 Internal Server Error // Unexpected server error
503 Service Unavailable // Temporary downtime
// ❌ WRONG: Always returning 200
res.status(200).json({ error: "User not found" }); // DON'T DO THIS!
// ✅ RIGHT
res.status(404).json({
type: "https://api.example.com/errors/not-found",
title: "Resource Not Found",
status: 404,
detail: "User with ID 12345 does not exist"
});
// ✅ STANDARDIZED ERROR FORMAT (RFC 7807)
{
"type": "https://api.example.com/errors/validation-failed",
"title": "Validation Failed",
"status": 422,
"detail": "The request body contains invalid fields",
"instance": "/v1/users",
"correlation_id": "f47ac10b-58cc-4372-a567-0e02b2c3d479",
"errors": [{ "field": "email", "code": "invalid_format", "message": "Email must be valid" }]
}
// Error handler middleware - never expose stack traces
app.use((err, req, res, next) => {
if (err instanceof ApiError) {
return res.status(err.status).json({ ...err, instance: req.originalUrl });
}
res.status(500).json({ type: "internal-error", title: "Internal Server Error", status: 500, correlation_id: generateCorrelationId() });
});
// ✅ SECURE JWT - Use RS256, short expiration, validate all claims
const validateJWT = async (req, res, next) => {
const token = req.headers.authorization?.substring(7);
if (!token) return res.status(401).json({ type: "unauthorized", status: 401, detail: "Bearer token required" });
try {
const decoded = jwt.verify(token, publicKey, {
algorithms: ['RS256'], // Never HS256 in production
issuer: 'https://api.example.com',
audience: 'https://api.example.com'
});
const isRevoked = await tokenCache.exists(decoded.jti); // Check revocation
if (isRevoked) throw new Error('Token revoked');
req.user = decoded;
next();
} catch (error) {
return res.status(401).json({ type: "invalid-token", status: 401, detail: "Invalid or expired token" });
}
};
// Scope-based authorization
const requireScope = (...scopes) => (req, res, next) => {
const hasScope = scopes.some(s => req.user.scope.includes(s));
if (!hasScope) return res.status(403).json({ type: "forbidden", status: 403, detail: `Required: ${scopes.join(', ')}` });
next();
};
app.get('/v1/users', validateJWT, requireScope('read:users'), getUsers);
📚 For advanced patterns, see:
# Bad: No caching
@router.get("/v1/products/{id}")
async def get_product(id: str):
return await db.products.find_one({"_id": id})
# Good: Redis cache with headers
@router.get("/v1/products/{id}")
async def get_product(id: str, response: Response):
cached = await redis_cache.get(f"product:{id}")
if cached:
response.headers["X-Cache"] = "HIT"
return cached
product = await db.products.find_one({"_id": id})
await redis_cache.setex(f"product:{id}", 300, product)
response.headers["Cache-Control"] = "public, max-age=300"
return product
# Bad: Offset pagination - O(n) skip
@router.get("/v1/users")
async def list_users(offset: int = 0, limit: int = 100):
return await db.users.find().skip(offset).limit(limit)
# Good: Cursor-based - O(1) performance
@router.get("/v1/users")
async def list_users(cursor: str = None, limit: int = Query(default=20, le=100)):
query = {"_id": {"$gt": ObjectId(cursor)}} if cursor else {}
users = await db.users.find(query).sort("_id", 1).limit(limit + 1).to_list()
has_next = len(users) > limit
return {"data": users[:limit], "pagination": {"next_cursor": str(users[-1]["_id"]) if has_next else None}}
# Bad: No compression
app = FastAPI()
# Good: GZip middleware for responses > 500 bytes
from fastapi.middleware.gzip import GZipMiddleware
app = FastAPI()
app.add_middleware(GZipMiddleware, minimum_size=500)
# Bad: New connection per request
@router.get("/v1/data")
async def get_data():
client = AsyncIOMotorClient("mongodb://localhost") # Expensive!
return await client.db.collection.find_one()
# Good: Shared pool via lifespan
@asynccontextmanager
async def lifespan(app: FastAPI):
app.state.db = AsyncIOMotorClient("mongodb://localhost", maxPoolSize=50, minPoolSize=10)
yield
app.state.db.close()
app = FastAPI(lifespan=lifespan)
@router.get("/v1/data")
async def get_data(request: Request):
return await request.app.state.db.mydb.collection.find_one()
# Bad: No rate limiting
@router.post("/v1/auth/login")
async def login(credentials: LoginRequest):
return await auth_service.login(credentials)
# Good: Tiered limits with Redis
from fastapi_limiter.depends import RateLimiter
@router.post("/v1/auth/login", dependencies=[Depends(RateLimiter(times=5, minutes=15))])
async def login(credentials: LoginRequest):
return await auth_service.login(credentials)
@router.get("/v1/users", dependencies=[Depends(RateLimiter(times=100, minutes=1))])
async def list_users():
return await user_service.list()
| Threat | Description | Key Mitigation |
|---|---|---|
| API1: Broken Object Level Authorization (BOLA) | Users can access objects belonging to others | Always verify user owns resource before returning data |
| API2: Broken Authentication | Weak auth allows token/credential compromise | Use RS256 JWT, short expiration, token revocation, rate limiting |
| API3: Broken Object Property Level Authorization | Exposing sensitive fields or mass assignment | Whitelist output/input fields, use DTOs, never expose passwords/keys |
| API4: Unrestricted Resource Consumption | No limits leads to DoS | Implement rate limiting, pagination limits, request timeouts |
| API5: Broken Function Level Authorization | Admin functions lack role checks | Verify roles/scopes for every privileged operation |
| API6: Unrestricted Access to Sensitive Business Flows | Business flows can be abused | Add CAPTCHA, transaction limits, step-up auth, anomaly detection |
Critical Security Rules:
// ✅ ALWAYS verify authorization
app.get('/users/:id/data', validateJWT, async (req, res) => {
if (req.user.sub !== req.params.id && !req.user.isAdmin) {
return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Forbidden' });
}
// Return data...
});
// ✅ ALWAYS filter sensitive fields
const sanitizeUser = (user) => ({
id: user.id,
name: user.name,
email: user.email
// NEVER: password_hash, ssn, api_key, internal_notes
});
// ✅ ALWAYS validate input
body('email').isEmail().normalizeEmail(),
body('age').optional().isInt({ min: 0, max: 150 })
// ✅ ALWAYS implement rate limiting
const apiLimiter = rateLimit({ windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000, max: 100 });
app.use('/api/', apiLimiter);
📚 SeeSecurity Examples for detailed implementations of each OWASP threat
| Anti-Pattern | Wrong | Right |
|---|---|---|
| Verbs in URLs | POST /createUser | POST /users |
| Always 200 | res.status(200).json({error: "Not found"}) | res.status(404).json({...}) |
| No rate limiting | app.post('/login', login) | Add rateLimit() middleware |
| Exposing secrets |
📚 SeeAnti-Patterns Guide for comprehensive examples
pytest tests/ -vopenapi-spec-validator openapi.yamlbandit -r app/You are an API design expert focused on:
Key Principles :
APIs are the foundation of modern applications. Design them with security, scalability, and developer experience as top priorities.
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| API7: Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF) | APIs make requests to attacker-controlled URLs | Whitelist allowed hosts, block private IPs, validate URLs |
| API8: Security Misconfiguration | Improper security settings | Set security headers, use HTTPS, configure CORS, disable debug |
| API9: Improper Inventory Management | Unknown/forgotten APIs | Use API gateway, maintain inventory, retire old versions |
| API10: Unsafe Consumption of APIs | Trust third-party APIs without validation | Validate external responses, implement timeouts, use circuit breakers |
res.json(user) |
res.json(sanitizeUser(user)) |
| No validation | db.query(..., [req.body]) | Use body('email').isEmail() |