vulnerability-scanner by sickn33/antigravity-awesome-skills
npx skills add https://github.com/sickn33/antigravity-awesome-skills --skill vulnerability-scanner像攻击者一样思考,像专家一样防御。掌握 2025 年威胁态势。
执行以下脚本进行自动化验证:
| 脚本 | 用途 | 用法 |
|---|---|---|
scripts/security_scan.py | 验证应用的安全原则 | python scripts/security_scan.py <project_path> |
| 文件 | 用途 |
|---|---|
| checklists.md | OWASP Top 10、认证、API、数据保护检查清单 |
广告位招租
在这里展示您的产品或服务
触达数万 AI 开发者,精准高效
| 原则 | 应用 |
|---|---|
| 假设已被入侵 | 设计时假设攻击者已在内部 |
| 零信任 | 永不信任,始终验证 |
| 纵深防御 | 多层防护,无单点故障 |
| 最小权限 | 仅授予所需的最小访问权限 |
| 故障安全 | 出错时,拒绝访问 |
扫描前,请思考:
| 排名 | 类别 | 思考要点 |
|---|---|---|
| A01 | 失效的访问控制 | 谁能访问什么?IDOR,SSRF |
| A02 | 安全配置错误 | 默认配置、标头、暴露的服务 |
| A03 | 软件供应链 🆕 | 依赖项、CI/CD、构建完整性 |
| A04 | 加密机制失效 | 弱加密、暴露的密钥 |
| A05 | 注入 | 用户输入 → 系统命令 |
| A06 | 不安全的设计 | 有缺陷的架构 |
| A07 | 身份验证失效 | 会话、凭据管理 |
| A08 | 完整性失效 | 未签名的更新、被篡改的数据 |
| A09 | 日志记录与监控不足 | 盲点、缺乏监控 |
| A10 | 异常条件处理 🆕 | 错误处理、故障开放状态 |
2021 → 2025 变化:
├── SSRF 并入 A01(访问控制)
├── A02 重要性提升(云/容器配置)
├── A03 新增:供应链(重点关注)
├── A10 新增:异常条件处理
└── 焦点转移:根本原因 > 表面症状
| 向量 | 风险 | 需要思考的问题 |
|---|---|---|
| 依赖项 | 恶意软件包 | 我们是否审计新的依赖项? |
| 锁定文件 | 完整性攻击 | 它们是否已提交? |
| 构建流水线 | CI/CD 被入侵 | 谁可以修改? |
| 注册表 | 域名仿冒 | 是否使用已验证的源? |
| 类别 | 要素 |
|---|---|
| 入口点 | API、表单、文件上传 |
| 数据流 | 输入 → 处理 → 输出 |
| 信任边界 | 进行身份验证/授权检查的位置 |
| 资产 | 密钥、PII、业务数据 |
风险 = 可能性 × 影响
高影响 + 高可能性 → 关键
高影响 + 低可能性 → 高
低影响 + 高可能性 → 中
低影响 + 低可能性 → 低
| 因素 | 权重 | 问题 |
|---|---|---|
| CVSS 分数 | 基础严重性 | 漏洞有多严重? |
| EPSS 分数 | 被利用的可能性 | 是否正在被利用? |
| 资产价值 | 业务上下文 | 面临风险的是什么? |
| 暴露程度 | 攻击面 | 是否面向互联网? |
是否正在被积极利用 (EPSS >0.5)?
├── 是 → 关键:立即行动
└── 否 → 检查 CVSS
├── CVSS ≥9.0 → 高
├── CVSS 7.0-8.9 → 考虑资产价值
└── CVSS <7.0 → 稍后安排
| 场景 | 故障开放(错误) | 故障关闭(正确) |
|---|---|---|
| 身份验证错误 | 允许访问 | 拒绝访问 |
| 解析失败 | 接受输入 | 拒绝输入 |
| 超时 | 无限重试 | 限制次数 + 中止 |
1. 侦察
└── 了解目标
├── 技术栈
├── 入口点
└── 数据流
2. 发现
└── 识别潜在问题
├── 配置审查
├── 依赖项分析
└── 代码模式搜索
3. 分析
└── 验证和优先级排序
├── 消除误报
├── 风险评分
└── 攻击链映射
4. 报告
└── 可操作的发现
├── 清晰的复现步骤
├── 业务影响
└── 修复指导
| 模式 | 风险 | 查找内容 |
|---|---|---|
| 查询中的字符串拼接 | 注入 | "SELECT * FROM " + user_input |
| 动态代码执行 | RCE | eval(), exec(), Function() |
| 不安全的反序列化 | RCE | pickle.loads(), unserialize() |
| 路径操作 | 遍历 | 文件路径中的用户输入 |
| 禁用的安全措施 | 多种 | verify=False, --insecure |
| 类型 | 指示符 |
|---|---|
| API 密钥 | api_key, apikey, 高熵值 |
| 令牌 | token, bearer, jwt |
| 凭据 | password, secret, key |
| 云服务 | AWS_, AZURE_, GCP_ 前缀 |
| 层级 | 您负责 | 提供商负责 |
|---|---|---|
| 数据 | ✅ | ❌ |
| 应用程序 | ✅ | ❌ |
| 操作系统/运行时 | 视情况而定 | 视情况而定 |
| 基础设施 | ❌ | ✅ |
| ❌ 不要 | ✅ 应该 |
|---|---|
| 在不理解的情况下扫描 | 首先映射攻击面 |
| 对每个 CVE 都发出警报 | 根据可利用性和资产确定优先级 |
| 忽略误报 | 维护已验证的基线 |
| 只修复表面症状 | 解决根本原因 |
| 仅在部署前扫描一次 | 持续扫描 |
| 盲目信任第三方依赖项 | 验证完整性,审计代码 |
每个发现项应回答:
| 严重性 | 标准 |
|---|---|
| 关键 | RCE、身份验证绕过、大规模数据泄露 |
| 高 | 数据泄露、权限提升 |
| 中 | 范围有限,需要特定条件 |
| 低 | 信息性、最佳实践 |
记住: 漏洞扫描发现的是问题。专家思维则确定哪些问题至关重要。始终要问:"攻击者会利用这个做什么?"
此技能适用于执行概述中描述的工作流程或操作。
每周安装量
426
代码仓库
GitHub 星标数
27.1K
首次出现
2026 年 1 月 20 日
安全审计
安装于
opencode355
gemini-cli342
claude-code312
codex305
cursor298
antigravity277
Think like an attacker, defend like an expert. 2025 threat landscape awareness.
Execute for automated validation:
| Script | Purpose | Usage |
|---|---|---|
scripts/security_scan.py | Validate security principles applied | python scripts/security_scan.py <project_path> |
| File | Purpose |
|---|---|
| checklists.md | OWASP Top 10, Auth, API, Data protection checklists |
| Principle | Application |
|---|---|
| Assume Breach | Design as if attacker already inside |
| Zero Trust | Never trust, always verify |
| Defense in Depth | Multiple layers, no single point |
| Least Privilege | Minimum required access only |
| Fail Secure | On error, deny access |
Before scanning, ask:
| Rank | Category | Think About |
|---|---|---|
| A01 | Broken Access Control | Who can access what? IDOR, SSRF |
| A02 | Security Misconfiguration | Defaults, headers, exposed services |
| A03 | Software Supply Chain 🆕 | Dependencies, CI/CD, build integrity |
| A04 | Cryptographic Failures | Weak crypto, exposed secrets |
| A05 | Injection | User input → system commands |
| A06 | Insecure Design | Flawed architecture |
| A07 | Authentication Failures | Session, credential management |
| A08 |
2021 → 2025 Shifts:
├── SSRF merged into A01 (Access Control)
├── A02 elevated (Cloud/Container configs)
├── A03 NEW: Supply Chain (major focus)
├── A10 NEW: Exceptional Conditions
└── Focus shift: Root causes > Symptoms
| Vector | Risk | Question to Ask |
|---|---|---|
| Dependencies | Malicious packages | Do we audit new deps? |
| Lock files | Integrity attacks | Are they committed? |
| Build pipeline | CI/CD compromise | Who can modify? |
| Registry | Typosquatting | Verified sources? |
| Category | Elements |
|---|---|
| Entry Points | APIs, forms, file uploads |
| Data Flows | Input → Process → Output |
| Trust Boundaries | Where auth/authz checked |
| Assets | Secrets, PII, business data |
Risk = Likelihood × Impact
High Impact + High Likelihood → CRITICAL
High Impact + Low Likelihood → HIGH
Low Impact + High Likelihood → MEDIUM
Low Impact + Low Likelihood → LOW
| Factor | Weight | Question |
|---|---|---|
| CVSS Score | Base severity | How severe is the vuln? |
| EPSS Score | Exploit likelihood | Is it being exploited? |
| Asset Value | Business context | What's at risk? |
| Exposure | Attack surface | Internet-facing? |
Is it actively exploited (EPSS >0.5)?
├── YES → CRITICAL: Immediate action
└── NO → Check CVSS
├── CVSS ≥9.0 → HIGH
├── CVSS 7.0-8.9 → Consider asset value
└── CVSS <7.0 → Schedule for later
| Scenario | Fail-Open (BAD) | Fail-Closed (GOOD) |
|---|---|---|
| Auth error | Allow access | Deny access |
| Parsing fails | Accept input | Reject input |
| Timeout | Retry forever | Limit + abort |
1. RECONNAISSANCE
└── Understand the target
├── Technology stack
├── Entry points
└── Data flows
2. DISCOVERY
└── Identify potential issues
├── Configuration review
├── Dependency analysis
└── Code pattern search
3. ANALYSIS
└── Validate and prioritize
├── False positive elimination
├── Risk scoring
└── Attack chain mapping
4. REPORTING
└── Actionable findings
├── Clear reproduction steps
├── Business impact
└── Remediation guidance
| Pattern | Risk | Look For |
|---|---|---|
| String concat in queries | Injection | "SELECT * FROM " + user_input |
| Dynamic code execution | RCE | eval(), exec(), Function() |
| Unsafe deserialization | RCE | pickle.loads(), unserialize() |
| Type | Indicators |
|---|---|
| API Keys | api_key, apikey, high entropy |
| Tokens | token, bearer, jwt |
| Credentials | password, secret, key |
| Cloud | , , prefixes |
| Layer | You Own | Provider Owns |
|---|---|---|
| Data | ✅ | ❌ |
| Application | ✅ | ❌ |
| OS/Runtime | Depends | Depends |
| Infrastructure | ❌ | ✅ |
| ❌ Don't | ✅ Do |
|---|---|
| Scan without understanding | Map attack surface first |
| Alert on every CVE | Prioritize by exploitability + asset |
| Ignore false positives | Maintain verified baseline |
| Fix symptoms only | Address root causes |
| Scan once before deploy | Continuous scanning |
| Trust third-party deps blindly | Verify integrity, audit code |
Each finding should answer:
| Severity | Criteria |
|---|---|
| Critical | RCE, auth bypass, mass data exposure |
| High | Data exposure, privilege escalation |
| Medium | Limited scope, requires conditions |
| Low | Informational, best practice |
Remember: Vulnerability scanning finds issues. Expert thinking prioritizes what matters. Always ask: "What would an attacker do with this?"
This skill is applicable to execute the workflow or actions described in the overview.
Weekly Installs
426
Repository
GitHub Stars
27.1K
First Seen
Jan 20, 2026
Security Audits
Gen Agent Trust HubPassSocketPassSnykPass
Installed on
opencode355
gemini-cli342
claude-code312
codex305
cursor298
antigravity277
Better Auth 身份验证技能指南:为 TypeScript/JavaScript 应用添加认证
11,300 周安装
Cloudflare 部署技能指南:从身份验证到产品决策树全解析
413 周安装
Render 部署指南:Git 驱动与 Docker 镜像部署全解析
413 周安装
SaaS财务指标速查表:收入、CAC、LTV等关键公式与基准快速查阅
414 周安装
iOS WidgetKit 开发指南:构建主屏幕、锁屏、灵动岛小组件与实时活动
414 周安装
web-haptics:为Web应用添加触觉反馈的JavaScript库,支持React、Vue、Svelte框架
414 周安装
PyTorch深度学习开发专家 | Transformer、扩散模型、LLM开发指南与最佳实践
414 周安装
| Integrity Failures |
| Unsigned updates, tampered data |
| A09 | Logging & Alerting | Blind spots, no monitoring |
| A10 | Exceptional Conditions 🆕 | Error handling, fail-open states |
| Path manipulation | Traversal | User input in file paths |
| Disabled security | Various | verify=False, --insecure |
AWS_AZURE_GCP_