malware-analyst by sickn33/antigravity-awesome-skills
npx skills add https://github.com/sickn33/antigravity-awesome-skills --skill malware-analystfile sample.exe sha256sum sample.exe
strings -a sample.exe | head -100 FLOSS sample.exe # 混淆字符串
diec sample.exe # Detect It Easy exeinfope sample.exe
rabin2 -i sample.exe dumpbin /imports sample.exe
### 阶段 3:静态分析
1. **载入反汇编器**:IDA Pro、Ghidra 或 Binary Ninja
2. **识别主要功能**:入口点、WinMain、DllMain
3. **映射执行流程**:关键决策点、循环
4. **识别能力**:网络、文件、注册表、进程操作
5. **提取威胁指标**:C2 地址、文件路径、互斥体名称
### 阶段 4:动态分析
环境设置:
执行:
记录:
## 在以下情况使用此技能
广告位招租
在这里展示您的产品或服务
触达数万 AI 开发者,精准高效
- 处理文件识别任务或工作流时
- 需要文件识别方面的指导、最佳实践或检查清单时
## 在以下情况不要使用此技能
- 任务与文件识别无关时
- 需要此范围之外的不同领域或工具时
## 使用说明
- 明确目标、约束条件和所需输入。
- 应用相关最佳实践并验证结果。
- 提供可操作的步骤和验证方法。
- 如果需要详细示例,请打开 `resources/implementation-playbook.md`。
## 常见恶意软件技术
### 持久化机制
注册表运行项 - HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run 计划任务 - schtasks、任务计划程序 服务 - CreateService、sc.exe WMI 订阅 - 用于执行的事件订阅 DLL 劫持 - 在搜索路径中放置 DLL COM 劫持 - 注册表 CLSID 修改 启动文件夹 - %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup 引导记录 - MBR/VBR 修改
### 规避技术
反虚拟机检测 - CPUID、注册表检查、计时 反调试 - IsDebuggerPresent、NtQueryInformationProcess 反沙箱 - 睡眠加速检测、鼠标移动 加壳 - UPX、Themida、VMProtect、自定义加壳器 混淆 - 字符串加密、控制流扁平化 进程镂空 - 注入到合法进程中 无文件攻击 - 使用内置工具(PowerShell、certutil)
### C2 通信
HTTP/HTTPS - 伪装成网络流量 DNS 隧道 - 通过 DNS 查询进行数据外泄 域名生成算法 - 用于弹性 C2 的 DGA 快速通量 - 快速变化的 DNS Tor/I2P - 匿名网络 社交媒体 - 将 Twitter、Pastebin 作为 C2 通道 云服务 - 将合法服务作为 C2
## 工具熟练度
### 分析平台
Cuckoo Sandbox - 开源自动化分析 ANY.RUN - 交互式云沙箱 Hybrid Analysis - VirusTotal 替代方案 Joe Sandbox - 企业沙箱解决方案 CAPE - 增强版的 Cuckoo 分支
### 监控工具
Process Monitor - 文件、注册表、进程活动 Process Hacker - 高级进程管理 Wireshark - 网络数据包捕获 API Monitor - Win32 API 调用日志记录 Regshot - 注册表更改比较
### 脱壳工具
Unipacker - 自动化脱壳框架 x64dbg + 插件 - 用于 IAT 重建的 Scylla OllyDumpEx - 内存转储和重建 PE-sieve - 检测镂空进程 UPX - 用于 UPX 加壳的样本
## 威胁指标提取
### 待提取的指标
```yaml
Network:
- IP addresses (C2 servers)
- Domain names
- URLs
- User-Agent strings
- JA3/JA3S fingerprints
File System:
- File paths created
- File hashes (MD5, SHA1, SHA256)
- File names
- Mutex names
Registry:
- Registry keys modified
- Persistence locations
Process:
- Process names
- Command line arguments
- Injected processes
rule Malware_Generic_Packer
{
meta:
description = "Detects common packer characteristics"
author = "Security Analyst"
strings:
$mz = { 4D 5A }
$upx = "UPX!" ascii
$section = ".packed" ascii
condition:
$mz at 0 and ($upx or $section)
}
# 恶意软件分析报告
## 执行摘要
- 样本识别
- 关键发现
- 威胁等级评估
## 样本信息
- 哈希值(MD5、SHA1、SHA256)
- 文件类型和大小
- 编译时间戳
- 加壳信息
## 静态分析
- 导入和导出
- 感兴趣的字符串
- 代码分析发现
## 动态分析
- 执行行为
- 网络活动
- 持久化机制
- 规避技术
## 威胁指标
- 网络威胁指标
- 文件系统威胁指标
- 注册表威胁指标
## 建议
- 检测规则
- 缓解步骤
- 修复指导
每周安装次数
117
代码仓库
GitHub 星标数
26.9K
首次出现时间
2026年1月28日
安全审计
安装于
opencode110
gemini-cli104
cursor104
codex102
github-copilot101
claude-code96
file sample.exe sha256sum sample.exe
strings -a sample.exe | head -100 FLOSS sample.exe # Obfuscated strings
diec sample.exe # Detect It Easy exeinfope sample.exe
rabin2 -i sample.exe dumpbin /imports sample.exe
### Phase 3: Static Analysis
1. **Load in disassembler**: IDA Pro, Ghidra, or Binary Ninja
2. **Identify main functionality**: Entry point, WinMain, DllMain
3. **Map execution flow**: Key decision points, loops
4. **Identify capabilities**: Network, file, registry, process operations
5. **Extract IOCs**: C2 addresses, file paths, mutex names
### Phase 4: Dynamic Analysis
Environment Setup:
Execution:
Documentation:
## Use this skill when
- Working on file identification tasks or workflows
- Needing guidance, best practices, or checklists for file identification
## Do not use this skill when
- The task is unrelated to file identification
- You need a different domain or tool outside this scope
## Instructions
- Clarify goals, constraints, and required inputs.
- Apply relevant best practices and validate outcomes.
- Provide actionable steps and verification.
- If detailed examples are required, open `resources/implementation-playbook.md`.
## Common Malware Techniques
### Persistence Mechanisms
Registry Run keys - HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Scheduled tasks - schtasks, Task Scheduler Services - CreateService, sc.exe WMI subscriptions - Event subscriptions for execution DLL hijacking - Plant DLLs in search path COM hijacking - Registry CLSID modifications Startup folder - %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup Boot records - MBR/VBR modification
### Evasion Techniques
Anti-VM - CPUID, registry checks, timing Anti-debugging - IsDebuggerPresent, NtQueryInformationProcess Anti-sandbox - Sleep acceleration detection, mouse movement Packing - UPX, Themida, VMProtect, custom packers Obfuscation - String encryption, control flow flattening Process hollowing - Inject into legitimate process Living-off-the-land - Use built-in tools (PowerShell, certutil)
### C2 Communication
HTTP/HTTPS - Web traffic to blend in DNS tunneling - Data exfil via DNS queries Domain generation - DGA for resilient C2 Fast flux - Rapidly changing DNS Tor/I2P - Anonymity networks Social media - Twitter, Pastebin as C2 channels Cloud services - Legitimate services as C2
## Tool Proficiency
### Analysis Platforms
Cuckoo Sandbox - Open-source automated analysis ANY.RUN - Interactive cloud sandbox Hybrid Analysis - VirusTotal alternative Joe Sandbox - Enterprise sandbox solution CAPE - Cuckoo fork with enhancements
### Monitoring Tools
Process Monitor - File, registry, process activity Process Hacker - Advanced process management Wireshark - Network packet capture API Monitor - Win32 API call logging Regshot - Registry change comparison
### Unpacking Tools
Unipacker - Automated unpacking framework x64dbg + plugins - Scylla for IAT reconstruction OllyDumpEx - Memory dump and rebuild PE-sieve - Detect hollowed processes UPX - For UPX-packed samples
## IOC Extraction
### Indicators to Extract
```yaml
Network:
- IP addresses (C2 servers)
- Domain names
- URLs
- User-Agent strings
- JA3/JA3S fingerprints
File System:
- File paths created
- File hashes (MD5, SHA1, SHA256)
- File names
- Mutex names
Registry:
- Registry keys modified
- Persistence locations
Process:
- Process names
- Command line arguments
- Injected processes
rule Malware_Generic_Packer
{
meta:
description = "Detects common packer characteristics"
author = "Security Analyst"
strings:
$mz = { 4D 5A }
$upx = "UPX!" ascii
$section = ".packed" ascii
condition:
$mz at 0 and ($upx or $section)
}
# Malware Analysis Report
## Executive Summary
- Sample identification
- Key findings
- Threat level assessment
## Sample Information
- Hashes (MD5, SHA1, SHA256)
- File type and size
- Compilation timestamp
- Packer information
## Static Analysis
- Imports and exports
- Strings of interest
- Code analysis findings
## Dynamic Analysis
- Execution behavior
- Network activity
- Persistence mechanisms
- Evasion techniques
## Indicators of Compromise
- Network IOCs
- File system IOCs
- Registry IOCs
## Recommendations
- Detection rules
- Mitigation steps
- Remediation guidance
Weekly Installs
117
Repository
GitHub Stars
26.9K
First Seen
Jan 28, 2026
Security Audits
Gen Agent Trust HubPassSocketPassSnykPass
Installed on
opencode110
gemini-cli104
cursor104
codex102
github-copilot101
claude-code96
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